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 5 
Mr. Shepard “Shep” Lowman graduated from Harvard Law School and later attended the Graduate 6 
School of Public Administration focusing on Economic Studies. In 1974 he was a political officer at the United States 7 
Embassy in Saigon, Vietnam. After the fall of Saigon, he assisted with the evacuation of Vietnamese in Saigon and 8 
was later given the "Superior Honor Award" for his tireless efforts. After 1975, he dedicated his time to Asian 9 
communities, working as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asian Refugees under the Bureau of Refugee Programs in 10 
Washington, D.C. During his six-year term Mr. Lowman developed and managed programs that assisted in the 11 
resettlement of 168,000 refugees per year in the U.S., including tens of thousands of Hmong.  Once again, he was 12 
awarded the "Superior Honor Award" for his creative management response to crisis.  He is currently a board 13 
member of Refugees International Emeritus and works as an independent consultant. Mr. Shep Lowman currently 14 
resides with his family in the state of Virginia.  In 2005, he was recognized with the National Alliance of 15 
Vietnamese American Service Agencies’ Lifetime Achievement Award.  16 
 Our time together was limited.  While Mr. Lowman’s work in Vietnam alone could have been discussed for 17 
several hours, we focused the time we had on his work in Washington, D.C. on behalf of refugees. 18 
Addendum:  Mr. Lowman died in 2013.  Here is an appreciation by a former colleague: 19 
http://www.afsa.org/sites/default/files/flipping_book/0613/files/assets/basic-html/page41.html 20 
 21 
(0:14)  If you don’t mind, I’d just be interested—because we’ve never met, obviously; I’ve 22 
only heard about you through other people—could you just talk briefly about where you 23 
were born, raised, and educated, and what led you on your career path? 24 
OK.  Born in New York City, raised in Texas—Oklahoma and Texas.  Parents were both 25 
professional people.  And I graduated from the University of Kentucky, and the Harvard Law 26 
School.  Went in, after some initial wandering around, wondering what I wanted to do, I went into 27 
the State Department, took the foreign service exam. 28 
 29 
(1:08)  Had anyone in your family been a part of the foreign service, or was this new? 30 
No, it was new. It was new.  I was working for a small but good stock brokerage in San Antonio, 31 
just getting started in that, and finding that was not what I wanted to do.  And I decided I wanted—32 
I had some time overseas before I settled down to do that.  So I thought, ‘I want to go back. I want 33 
to get involved in overseas situations.’  And I was doing some research in the local library on 34 
international companies, and the librarian was quite helpful.  She found out what I was doing, and 35 
she said, ‘Well, you know, have you ever considered foreign service?  My son took the foreign 36 
service exam, and it he didn’t pass it, but it seemed like it would be an interesting career.’  ‘All right, 37 
I’ll’… 38 
 39 
(2:30)  A tip from a librarian!  How interesting is that?  [Laughs] 40 
Saying that, ‘Well, where can I do this?  I’ll take the exam,’ you know?  I took the exam and I passed 41 
the exam, and I thought when I got to Washington—I was so stupid.  They told me, ‘You passed, 42 
but there are security clearances and medical clearances, and then just generally, you have—so wait 43 
until you hear from us. 44 
Now what year was this? 45 
This was ’56.  And it turned out later on, I really was dumb, because I quit my job, and went off to 46 
visit my parents before I went overseas—you know, it was just so automatic.  It turned out that 47 
people waited years sometimes.  But for me it worked just fine.  I—just about the time I had a 48 
couple of weeks with my parents, they called me and said, ‘Come down to Washington.’  I had 49 
already shipped stuff there.  I had already shipped what little gear I had, [Chuckles] and so when I 50 
got down there, I said, [Phone rings] ‘Here are the costs for me to’— Let me just [Goes to answer 51 
phone, interviewer pauses recorder] 52 
 53 
(4:16)  Anyhow, that’s how I got started.  And I expected when I got—when they actually took me 54 
on board—by this time I—between law school, and I had been in the navy for a couple of years, 55 
right at the end of the war—this would be World War II—I’d had a couple of years in the navy 56 
before that was over with, so by the time I got out of law school, I was about [Pauses]  Let’s see.  57 
[Pauses]  I must have been about 26.  And so when I got—and I did a few things and I ended up 58 
and I passed the exam.  And I had every expectation when I got down that the entering class—my 59 
classmates were about 30 officers coming on board—were probably all graduates of the Foreign 60 
Affairs School in Georgetown or something, you know, and had been dreaming of doing this for 61 
years.  It turned out [Chuckling] that most of them were just like me.  They had done other stuff and 62 
then gotten in, so—but at any rate, I had a career in the foreign service which I found very 63 
fascinating and rewarding. 64 
 65 
(5:51)  It was probably an asset, don’t you think, that these people came in with life 66 
experiences and— 67 
Oh yeah, I think so, and I think the State Department thought so, too.  That’s how they let me in.  68 
So I started off as—I had several jobs in Europe.  The first post was in Vienna, and went from 69 
there, and so I was sitting there in [Pauses] 1965.  It looked like I was headed to being a European 70 
specialist, especially in trade and economic matters—expected to go and be a member of the GATT 71 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] team in Geneva, and I was sitting there in Washington 72 
one day, and across comes this little flyer from personnel saying,  ‘Looking for people that are 73 
interested in going to Vietnam and being advisors—on loan to USAID as an advisor to a province 74 
chief—so a field job.  ‘That certainly sounds interesting.  Maybe I ought to just do a little detour and 75 
do that.’  So I did.  And stayed in Vietnam and Southeast Asia from then on.   76 
 77 
(7:46)  Do you happen to remember the name Erland Heginbotham? 78 
Who? 79 
Erland Heginbotham? 80 
I want to, but I can’t place it. 81 
Well, I'm staying with him and his wife Eleanor, and he was USAID in Vietnam.  And when 82 
I mentioned your name he said, ‘Boy, that name sounds familiar.’  So maybe you crossed 83 
paths somewhere along the line. 84 
I think that’s probably right, yeah.  Certainly an awful lot of people out there! 85 
Oh, yeah, I’m sure. 86 
So I did that, did that for four years, and ended up with—I don’t know if you’ve heard of the 87 
CORDS operation, [Civil Operations, Revolutionary Development Support] but… 88 
I’ve heard that… 89 
Well, that was the—they finally decided—it was a good plan.  They took all of the field elements:  90 
military, USAID, intelligence, the whole schmear, and put it in one field effort.  And I ended up, my 91 
last job, my last six or seven months out of that four years I was the senior advisor to the—what do 92 
they call it?  The CORDS Senior Advisor.  But the job was to be—to run that kind of a team in Da 93 
Nang city, which was an interesting thing to do, too.  I went back and had some other jobs to do 94 
with the Philippines and so on, and in ’73, I went back out to Vietnam on six months in the embassy 95 
this time, watching the play-out of the so-called peace agreement.  And my job there—because when 96 
I left Vietnam I spoke fairly good Vietnamese, but never had much formal training at it.  But I did—97 
but three months, which for Vietnam doesn’t quite hack it.  So my job—and they brought back—98 
my god, they must have brought back 30 or 40 foreign service officers—pulled them out of the jobs 99 
they were in out there, and most of them had had good training and spoke excellent Vietnamese. So 100 
they put them out in the field, and they were sending in—so my job was to sit in Saigon with a small 101 
group—four of us, and put together a daily report and a weekly report, which was very interesting.  102 
It gave me a very—kind of good, overall picture of what was going on.  At the end of that time, I 103 
went back to my job—or no, went on to a job I had been getting ready for when they pulled me up 104 
to do that in the political section of the embassy in Manila.  And I was there about a year, and a job 105 
opened up as director of the internal affairs unit of the political section in Saigon—the job being to 106 
follow political events in the government.  And I jumped at that, ‘cause I wanted to do it.  I stayed 107 
there, then, until it came time to leave [Pauses] by helicopter. 108 
 109 
(12:10)  So in a way you had a pretty intimate understanding of what was going on and 110 
events that led to this—as they keep referring to it—the largest air evacuation in world 111 
history. 112 
Yeah.  So I took part in that and got back to Washington, heartsick, of course, as most of us were.  113 
And I really didn’t want to get particularly involved.  A lot of the guys did, but I wasn't really looking 114 
to get involved in the big resettlement effort, which was run by Julia Taft. 115 
Right.  Inter-Agency Task Force. 116 
Yeah.  In any case, besides that there were Hiep’s parents and sister and brother-in-law and child, a 117 
couple of other people temporarily, along with ourselves and our five kids, to get resettled here, so 118 
the department was very—they didn’t know what to do with half of us, anyway.  A lot of people 119 
coming back, so I had a fair amount of leave and then after that, sort of [Pauses]  So I reported and 120 
checked out again for several months.  And we got our house fixed up and built four rooms in the 121 
basement for people, that kind of stuff.  But they asked me to come in and get involved in the office 122 
of the [Pauses]  I’ve forgotten its title, but its job was the senior advisor to the secretary on refugee 123 
matters.  And this was the element within the State Department that was doing that for the State 124 
Department.  And I believe that we made contributions to what Julia was doing on her Inter-Agency 125 
Task Force.  But this was a more permanent thing, ‘cause she was—she checked out at the end of 126 
the year—and did a wonderful job.  She got everybody out of those camps by the end of the (***) or 127 
about six months.  But the job that I had and that I did want to do was to try to make sure that all of 128 
the former employees, that did get out—those that got out and were here, were given all of the 129 
assistance that we could give them, all that they had coming, and as much as we could do for them.  130 
So I was doing that, and then the Task Force was just in the process of closing down, and Lionel 131 
[Rosenblatt] went back out on a trip.  He’s probably described this to you. 132 
Right. 133 
And he came back and gave a report that said that there were many people out there to whom we 134 
had an obligation, whose history was very strong in terms of our obligations to them.  And these 135 
included Hmong, but also lots of others.  Some—many of them Cambodians and Vietnamese. 136 
 137 
(17:09)  Lao and Lao Theung and maybe some of those other ethnic groups? 138 
A little bit.  But from all three countries—had ended up in different places.  Most of them were in 139 
Thailand, but they were also scattered around other places around the region.  But less—that 140 
became a much bigger thing later on.  So Lionel was saying, I think estimating 10,000 people or so, 141 
in places.  And my reaction to—I was looking at a job in Chicago in the economic section.  And he 142 
knew that.  So he was very disappointed in the attitudes and reaction to these problems in the 143 
embassy in Bangkok.  The guy that was doing refugees didn’t want to be doing refugees.  I guess he 144 
was somebody in the political section that they'd sort of assigned to do that, but he didn’t want—he 145 
wasn’t interested.  The embassy itself was very lackadaisical about that subject.  But Lionel wanted to 146 
go in there, and he said the only way—and we agreed about the only way that [Pauses]  Well I guess 147 
maybe I said it. Anyway, we agreed that there were not going to be any possibility [of success unless 148 
Lowman stayed in Washington and backed up Rosenblatt’s work in Thailand]—‘cause we’d had 149 
some blowback already from the immigration subcommittee in the House.  I can’t even remember 150 
the man’s name now.  I think he was… 151 
 152 
(19:33)  Oh, yeah, I think Lionel mentioned him.  I can’t think of his name at the moment. 153 
He ran into some big legal troubles later on, but [Chuckles]  But at that time he was a very powerful 154 
man.  So he had—the original, I guess, 130,000 figure was all the people that came out by boat and 155 
all the other—whatever.  And we went back for 3,000 numbers for Hmong.  I think that was done 156 
before our office of State became involved in those matters.  We knew about it but I don’t think we 157 
made it happen.  But they took it back up—I guess Julia must have taken it back up to the hill, and 158 
‘All right, 3,000 more, but that’s it, and I don’t want to see anything more of you.’  [Interviewer 159 
chuckles]   160 
A real charmer. 161 
And here has; he wanted 10,000 more.  When I think of it, I think I made the point to him which 162 
he—I think he accepted that there was no chance of just walking up to the hill and saying ‘Give us 163 
some more.’  We would have to have a very deliberate census of the people in the camps and be able 164 
to go back to them and say, ‘We have 300 of this and 2,000 of that’ and really speak with some 165 
authority about what it was we wanted to bring in and where those numbers would go.  And he said, 166 
‘And then the problem is getting the embassy to do that.’  I said, ‘I know.  I think—the truth is that 167 
unless you went out there yourself and took this on, it’s probably not going to happen.’  At this time 168 
something bureaucratic—and I can’t remember the exact details, but something bureaucratic had 169 
happened to suddenly get me involved in that—I guess because the Inter-Agency Task Force had 170 
shut down. But there was a lot of money left, and that money was in our bank account, so we had 171 
control of it, bureaucratically. 172 
 173 
(23:17)  Now when you say ‘our’ you mean the state department, you mean your office? 174 
Well, basically in the office that I worked for, yeah. And there was a lot of it left, but it had to be 175 
spent by… 176 
Maybe June 30th of the following year? 177 
Yeah. 178 
Something close to that, anyway. 179 
June 30th of… 180 
’76? 181 
Mm-hmm.  Yeah.  So I said, ‘We have money, but unless you go out there and do something to 182 
make it happen, it probably won’t happen.’  And Lionel said to me, ‘Well, it’s a little bit the same 183 
here in Washington.  If I put together all these nice media [meaty?] reports, there’s got to be 184 
someone here to read them!’  [Both chuckle]  So if I go out to Bangkok, will you stay on this job for 185 
a while?’  And…‘OK.’  So that was the beginning of a—‘cause I didn’t know Lionel very well.  I 186 
knew him, but I hadn’t—we both had served in Vietnam, maybe even at the same time, but I never 187 
met him the first time around.  I didn’t really—I don’t think I had met him until he made his famous 188 
trip over there, and [Pause]  You know—oh, I wish I could remember for sure which floor—I don’t 189 
want to get the floor wrong, but the ambassador was on the third floor or the second floor, and we 190 
in the political section were on a different floor. If he was on the third floor, we were on the second.  191 
And Washington had sent word out, ‘Find that guy and his partner, Craig [Johnstone] and put him 192 
on an airplane and send him back here.’  ‘Cause he came out of the…  Craig was—the two of them 193 
had been working for senior officers on the seventh floor of the State Department. 194 
OK. 195 
And they jumped in an airplane and came out to Vietnam to round up some of their—‘cause they 196 
saw it coming—to round up some of their close people that they felt an obligation to, and to try to 197 
do what they could do get them out.  So Washington found out where they’d gone and told the 198 
ambassador, ‘Find those guys and put them on an airplane and send them back here pronto.’  So 199 
Lionel was in and out of the embassy, but he was never on the ambassador’s third floor—he only 200 
came to the political section, second floor. [Both chuckle]  But we made that agreement, and kept at 201 
it for—I stayed in that job five years.  And he was pulled out—he had an assignment to go to 202 
Chinese language training.  So he had to break out of that about ’77, and Tom Barnes took it over 203 
temporarily, but we managed—which is a very difficult thing to do—we managed to break his 204 
assignment— 205 
Wow. 206 
—out of Chinese language and brought him back again when it became obvious that there was 207 
going to be a major problem.  But anyway— 208 
 209 
(28:30)  It was your office that did that?  That got him out of his— 210 
Aaah…   Well, we did a lot of stuff that we didn’t—weren’t really authorized to do 211 
[Chuckles]  Most good work is done that way.  [Both laugh] 212 
So we (***) him for it and got people that were able to do that. 213 
 214 
(29:01)  So what was the name of this area of the [State] department you were working for at 215 
this time? 216 
Well, it was the office of the—one of those bureaucratic elements that was within the office of the 217 
Secretary of State.  218 
OK. 219 
And, as I say, I can’t recall the exact title, but it was like Senior Advisor for Migration and Refugee 220 
Affairs or something like that. 221 
OK.  I’ll find it. [He worked at the Office of Asian Refugees, now the Office of Population, 222 
Refugees, and Migration, in the Bureau for Refugee Programs] 223 
And I can’t remember the name.  When Jimmy Carter came in as president, he appointed as the 224 
senior—this job went to a human rights lady—a woman advocate of human rights, very well known.  225 
I mean, that’s the kind of thing that bothers me that I can’t call her name up.  I worked for her, she 226 
supported me in all, and I just can’t pull it out.  Maybe it will come to me as we talk.  But she was 227 
very interested in making human rights a part of the considerations that are taken account of when 228 
you’re dealing with international policy.  And she really didn’t have time much for refugees.  That 229 
wasn't her main thing.  I was a fairly junior officer at that point; I was a Class 3 officer and she 230 
was—you know, it was upper middle grade but not senior, certainly.  So I inherited—I was sort of 231 
the guy who was in charge of the unit that did migration, which was mainly just keeping track of the 232 
people coming in—Jews from the Soviet Union and other—that was one of the biggest groups, but 233 
it wasn't really large compared to this sort of thing that came later.  And it was an established 234 
program, so I sort of inherited that unit at about the time that all of this came about, and then stayed 235 
with it.  That activity was taken out of the Secretary’s office and put into eventually—this took a 236 
while for this to happen—it was put into a new Bureau for Refugee Affairs.  But in the meantime 237 
they were sort of—but they were very supportive.  So I just was doing a lot of stuff that my grade of 238 
officer wouldn’t have an opportunity to do, because it involved a lot of money and so on.  And it 239 
was just sort of—I inherited and stayed with it for five years.  And we built a huge program.  By the 240 
time we finished we had about a half a billion dollar program in 1975 dollars.  And were moving, at 241 
the end—it peaked in ’79 and ’80 and we were moving 14,000 a month out of Southeast Asia and 242 
into the homes of Americans. 243 
 244 
(34:10)  So was there much Congressional interference or attempted oversight of what you 245 
were doing, or were you pretty much— 246 
Well, there was [Pauses] I’ll come to that. 247 
OK.  [Chuckles] 248 
So that’s the bureaucratic thing, but it started out very small and grew to this major activity.  And I 249 
had the good fortune to not have it taken out of my hands and given to somebody else.  I’ve had 250 
bosses imposed over me, but they never really got in my way. 251 
They probably for the most part assumed that you knew what you were doing and… 252 
Well, I was—yeah.  So here we were.  Lionel was out in Southeast Asia.  He agreed.  We came to an 253 
agreement on that.  And he had a good piece of good fortune, because there were a bunch of Peace 254 
Corps types that were mostly young ones in those days, Peace Corps volunteers, who were just 255 
coming to the end of the tour in Thailand.  And he recruited the whole crowd.  And [Chuckles] you 256 
know, they spoke Thai, and they didn’t speak Vietnamese or—they might have [spoken] maybe 257 
some dialects and some Hmong, but they could get around the country and they were very 258 
committed, and so they went out there and they put together this thing, and they really did get a 259 
census.  And we had [Pauses] I wish I could remember a little more certainly about—but I think that 260 
we had already had a hearing in April, I think.  I know it was—we really had to push.  I believe it 261 
was in April, but I'm not sure—and went back to the hill.  And we had Phil Habib at that time, and 262 
very committed to the refugees.  We had a lot of people like that in the department, very senior 263 
people; that’s what made it possible for us.  We lived on the support of the senior officers who had 264 
been involved in Vietnam for quite some time. Eventually we outgrew that, but…  So he was the 265 
one who testified before the House subcommittee.  And they were pretty grumpy about it.  But we 266 
had it packaged, so it was pretty hard—Lionel’s package was pretty hard to deny.  What I don’t 267 
know, which would be of interest to you—maybe you could go back to Lionel on this.  I don’t know 268 
whether Hmong were included in that. 269 
 270 
(38:35)  He said that they were never separated as a unique group.  They were just kept as 271 
part of the ex-Lao population. 272 
But whether there were Hmong that were included in that 10- or 11,000 that we got… 273 
I think that 11,000 included a good number of Hmong.  ‘Cause I know he said they went 274 
around to the camps and they interviewed a lot of Hmong people so they could get them 275 
processed by that June 30th, ’76 date. 276 
OK.  Then that was Hmong.  277 
Yeah. 278 
OK.  Well that’s what I thought, but I couldn’t remember for certain.  So once we got a go on that, 279 
we had to just go like crazy.  And over the years, there were three of us that really worked so closely 280 
together that you could say—I was the guy that was in charge of the office.  But Lionel was in 281 
charge out in Bangkok, which was always the biggest center of refugee activity, although it became 282 
very urgent in other parts of Southeast Asia over time.  And Hank Cushing, who was an AID officer 283 
whom I knew from Vietnam, and I recruited him as my deputy.  And the three of us stayed in that, 284 
except for a short period of Chinese language training, but other than that, the three of us stayed in 285 
that until [Pauses] Well, I stayed until ’81, and Hank stayed until a few years after that, and Lionel 286 
actually left a little earlier to go be Counselor General in Ottawa, I think.  But for four or five years 287 
we worked that problem.  And I gave Hank the job of getting these people in and approved, but it 288 
was just an absolute mare’s nest, because there was no structure to handle that kind of thing, and 289 
they had us get—fortunately, they had a—what is it?  IOM—International Organization for 290 
Migration, I guess.  They call it ICMC now, I think, but anyway, it was IOM—had a very seasoned 291 
old man there, and so the way it broke down was Lionel—and Lionel was in charge of the whole 292 
thing; he sat over it… 293 
 294 
(41:53)  [Reaching for his bag]  I’m just jotting down a note of things to ask you later as they 295 
pop into my head.  [As it turns out, his pad is out in the car.  Mr. Lowman gets him a pad of 296 
paper.] 297 
 298 
(42:32)  So, in fact some of those Peace Corps volunteers went to IOM and some stayed in Lionel’s 299 
operation.  But in terms of the breakdown of the jobs, which became much more formalized later—300 
but IOM people took on, I think, even then, the medical checks and the transportation. 301 
 302 
(43:09)  And that, I think, got some help from this guy Albert Corcos in ICEM? 303 
Albert!  That’s the seasoned guy I’m talking about.   304 
OK.  I think it might have been called ‘ICEM’ back then.   305 
At that time? 306 
Or maybe he was a part of more than one organization. 307 
No, no.  it keeps changing its name.  I'm not certain.  At point it was IOM, one point it was ICMC, 308 
ICEM.  I-C-E-M, maybe? 309 
‘European Migration’ I know was the ‘EM’.  I can’t quite remember the—anyway, that was 310 
Albert Corcos. 311 
Yeah. 312 
OK. 313 
We kept drafting him back.  He kept trying to retire from ICEM and go and play golf and boat in 314 
France, and we’d haul him back to do another—yeah, he’s great.  He’s still around. 315 
Yeah, he’s in his 90s now, I think. 316 
He’s in his 90s—pretty well into his 90s and still pretty active. 317 
I think John Tucker said he had some amazing house with a spiral staircase and a beautiful 318 
view. 319 
I’ve never seen his place, yeah.  Did you have a good piece of time with John Tucker?   320 
We spoke over the phone, but for three nights in a row, so yeah, we probably talked for five 321 
hours or more total. 322 
Good.  That’s good.   323 
 324 
(44:47)  Well anyway, let’s see.  Where are we? 325 
Moving refugees through— 326 
Yeah, but the paperwork!  First of all they had to go in, and the energy of these people [Pauses] I 327 
mean, at very first they had to build a file.  Once they’d built that file, and they had to do some 328 
screening to decide which ones they would— they wouldn’t just submit everybody to INS 329 
inspectors.  But on the other hand, they didn’t want to play God.  If a guy had a fair chance, then 330 
they put him before the INS.  And then the INS had to see them, and they would approve or not 331 
approve.  But once that happened, they had to—there weren’t any NGO resettlement people out 332 
there.  And so we had to have them send all this stuff in to Washington.  And in those days, most of 333 
the refugee NGOs had their headquarters in New York.  Some of them still do—most of them at 334 
that time.  Except, I think the Catholics were still down here [Washington, DC].  So we had to 335 
take—we rented a first floor—a big office building on Connecticut Avenue somewhere, and all the 336 
resettlement agencies sent their people down and so we had this flood of paper coming in.  No real 337 
system set up.  So Hank was in charge of that, and he could somehow get everybody there and 338 
working with him.  And they went on 24 hour operation to get that stuff done, and they got it done, 339 
but it was really a mare’s nest.  And as a result of that, we got 11,000 people in, but in addition, the 340 
memory of that experience played a real part in the development of the program as it went forward 341 
later on.  Now when we took on that 11,000, all of us sort of thought, ‘Oh, that’s about it.  There’ll 342 
be some people coming out that’ll show up, and we do need a few numbers, and we need some kind 343 
of a possibility.  So in those days they had something they called seventh preference, which was 344 
really a refugee preference, and there were some numbers available, and it was mainly for the 345 
Russians of central Europe.  A European program.  But we managed to get a little slice of that.  I 346 
think it was something like 5-, 6-, maybe 700 numbers a year, just to sort of cover the odd one that 347 
comes out.  And that didn’t take any special activity, but then, as we got into ’77, I guess, the 348 
numbers began to climb.  And we could see that we were in for a longer-term deal.  So we— 349 
 350 
[Someone comes to the door.  Interviewer pauses recorder.] 351 
 352 
(49:55)  So then, as we began to sort of wrestle with the idea of more people coming out, we began 353 
to develop a little more orderly procedure, and then we basically, maybe late ‘70s—’77, maybe 354 
[Pauses]  In Europe, the program had been operated through a whole string of NGOs that were 355 
there helping refugees in Europe and mostly US NGOs, but they were over there in Europe helping 356 
people, and also taking part in the migration process.  And we were subsidizing them, and it was 357 
fairly expensive.  We didn’t have that out of Southeast Asia; there wasn't anything like that, and to 358 
create it would take time, and it just didn’t look like that would work very well.  So instead, we 359 
developed a… 360 
 361 
(51:36)  Is this the Joint Voluntary Agency? 362 
…a situation where one agency would be chosen to be the operating entity for all of the agencies 363 
back in New York, so that all of these files—they would hire staff, they would provide the senior 364 
person out there, and then—not the Ref Cord [Refugee Coordinator]—not the State Department 365 
officer, but the senior person to manage this part of the operation.  So they would hire the people or 366 
send the people out or whatever.  And they would do the interviews and the camp work and so on 367 
and so on.  And the little more formalized relationships with how they could interact with ICEM 368 
and how they would—the extent to which they could have any contact with INS officers, how that 369 
would happen, and so on.   So we had kind of just—it was just sort of beginning that when the 370 
numbers became sufficiently great that we had to go back in there for more numbers.  And I can’t 371 
remember anymore now exactly what month we did that.  I think it was August ’77.  And I can’t 372 
remember for sure.  I think there was 24,000—half land and half boat people. 373 
 374 
(53:58)  So how does that work exactly?  Who do you go to and how do you get authorized 375 
to— 376 
Well, we had—of course, we had to sell it in the building, to begin with, and then we had to go back 377 
to Congress again—both committees.  But the tough committee was—I think even then, Senator 378 
Kennedy had the migration subcommittee.  But to get through the House was what was hard.  And 379 
again, by this time Phil Habib—when he testified the first time he was assistant secretary for Asia.  380 
And this time he'd moved up to being the undersecretary for political affairs.  So he went and 381 
testified again.  He said this time, [Chuckling] ‘I’m not going to tell you this is the last time I’m 382 
coming up.’  And he gave it a strong pitch, and they accepted it and grumbled and so on, but they 383 
did accept it.  But I can really see that we were coming pretty close to the end of what the building 384 
could do for us.  I mean, as long as Habib was there, I know he’d try to do everything he could, but 385 
had just gotten very difficult.  And you could see that it was—that now there as something new 386 
happening—that it was these people coming out like this, and that just wasn’t going to go away.  So 387 
one of the—‘Chavchavaj’ who was a refugee program officer, a civil service position on the refugee 388 
office. 389 
 390 
(56:37)  And what was the name again?  I’m sorry, I think I missed— 391 
‘Chavchavaj’—I’m not sure how you spell it 392 
‘Chav-chavage’   I’ll see what I can find.  [Both laugh]  [Chavchavadze?] 393 
C-H-A-V…  394 
And then maybe ‘Savage’ but pronounced ‘Sa-VAJH.’  395 
C-H- something.  I don’t know. But she was a very politically-oriented type, and one day she said to 396 
me, ‘You know, Shep, you just aren’t going to be able to do this unless you get some help outside 397 
this building.’  And I said, ‘How am I going to do that?  I don’t’—  And so she didn’t have any 398 
suggestions, but it was just that thought stuck in my head.  And so we’d become fairly close to 399 
[Pauses to remember name]  Now I’m in trouble.  I’ll just have to skip—be more vague about it, but 400 
we had to get our partners in the resettlement side of things who had a lot more contact with the 401 
world out there than we did as bureaucrats.  And so Leo Cherne and the International Refugee 402 
[Rescue?] Committee—there you are.  He was the chairman. 403 
Leo Cherne. 404 
Leo Cherne.  [Spells the last name.  Mrs. Lowman brings in some tea.]  We had asked them to 405 
provide us with the first director of the office in Bangkok of this new… 406 
 407 
(59:51)  So in other words, International Rescue Committee became the primary agency in 408 
Thailand. 409 
That’s right.  And remained—kept that through the whole—right through, the whole time that I was 410 
around. 411 
So this would have been late ’77 or early ’78? 412 
I think ’77.  But anyway, Leo had made a trip, or had planned a trip to Africa to look at the situation 413 
in some of the front-line states around Zimbabwe.  And I had made a trip like that myself during a 414 
period when we didn’t think there was going to be all that much work to do with Vietnamese, so I 415 
got to pick up on some of these other things.  And so he wanted a briefing and so I gave him a 416 
briefing, and he went off and did his trip, he came back to New York and I said, ‘I wonder if he 417 
would be willing to try to help out and so I called him and I said, ‘I would like to come up and see 418 
you,’ and he said, ‘Fine,’ so I did.  I began to describe the situation that was developing, and 419 
indicating that we were going to have—if we didn’t get more resources, we were not going to be 420 
able to handle what I saw coming.  And as I hand him all this, Leo asked, ‘Well, why are you telling 421 
me this?’  And I said, ‘Well, I don’t really know.  I just am frustrated and worried and thought you 422 
might have some thoughts.’  And he said, ‘Well, yes, I do.’  And he said, ‘In the past, IRC has set out 423 
a so-called Citizen’s Commission to look at situations and make recommendations.  And let me 424 
think a little bit and maybe talk with some people a little bit and see whether something like that 425 
might make sense.’  Wonderful.  Well, it did.  He put it together, and it included—I can’t remember 426 
their names anymore, but—Ronald Reagan’s (***) director of the Securities and Exchange 427 
Commission to a black gay labor leader.  That’s a pretty good span—and everything in between:  a 428 
well-known Jewish rabbi, a well-known Catholic priest, and so on.  Eight or ten people.  They paid 429 
their own way.  IRC provided Bob DeVecchi, who later became the executive director for the IRC.  430 
He was deputy, I think, at that time.  But he went out as a staffer and became the first joint 431 
voluntary agency director. 432 
 433 
(1:04:22)  If you don’t mind, I’ve used these terms and I just want to make sure that I use 434 
them properly and that I understand this organization.  So ‘Joint Voluntary Agency’ is 435 
something that you created so that in each country there would be a primary NGO or non-436 
profit or something that would be primarily responsible for heading up the resettlement 437 
effort.  Is that a fair explanation of— 438 
Not quite. 439 
OK.  Well, this is exactly why I asked.  [Laughs] 440 
Because what you just described is what the Ref Cord, which is a US government position—Refugee 441 
Coordinator.  That’s what Lionel was.  He as responsible for all refugee activity, including that, and 442 
he directed the work of any of the NGOs that had that contract for Thailand.  And then others 443 
would be other places.  But what they were responsible for was that piece of activity that involved 444 
liaison with the UN and the Thai authority in the camps, the screening of the population as it came 445 
into the camps, the development of—especially of case files where they think there is a possibility 446 
that they might be able—they probably did everybody, but especially those that seemed to have a 447 
chance of getting taken—and then arranging for in-country transportation, getting them to the INS 448 
for interviews, all that kind of thing.  So up to that point, up to the point of INS approval, and then 449 
they deliver them to IOM [ICEM]. 450 
 451 
(1:06:54)  So in a way you could almost call it ‘pre-resettlement’—refugee services more. 452 
Yeah, that’s right.  It was pre-resettlement, and it was after they were approved by INS that the job 453 
shifts over to ICEM. 454 
OK. 455 
But that’s not quite right, either.  That misses an important part of their function, a very important 456 
part of their function, and one of the reasons they were created, actually.  ‘Cause all that I’m telling 457 
you about is what they did before these Peace Corps volunteers did for Lionel.  They—and State 458 
Department these days would tell you that’s not [Pauses]  We don’t like that so much.  But when I 459 
was running it, they had a second job of keeping their fellow agencies here informed, and informed 460 
of simple, very direct things like Nguyen Van Nguyen is being held up because of a health problem 461 
to more sensitive subjects such as we think INS is being too tough on this category of person.  But it 462 
was their privilege to have opinions and to keep their people back in Washington abreast.  And that 463 
was part of what kept them always as a strong supporter of the program, because they understood 464 
what was going on out there.  So—this big piece of paper I was talking about, getting those people 465 
out of that place in ’76, that was their problem. We dealt in several cases, and certainly in Bangkok, 466 
Malaysia, Singapore—at least those three and maybe some other places.  We built a whole separate 467 
communication system and file room and everything.  Otherwise it would have completely 468 
overwhelmed the commo guys in the embassy, the volume of it, so we just built our own.  Of 469 
course, it was under the control of the ambassador, but for that purpose.  And they would send— 470 
when INS approved somebody, they would send that fact and something about the family and so on 471 
to New York, not to us.  We didn’t want to hear about it.  Send it to New York.  And there was 472 
this—and this group all came together in a roof organization.  I can’t remember the name of it.  473 
Boy, I sat in their conference room often enough.  (***)  But anyway, there we funded the 474 
communications for them. 475 
 476 
…They’re in New York.  And it later was sucked into the current—well, I take that back to…   477 
Anyway, their organization had been part of a big roof organization of almost all of the international 478 
agencies working overseas, NGOs, and they had some differences of opinions and didn’t think they 479 
were getting any kind of specialized—it was kind of pushing into their area.  So they created their 480 
own organization.  They then came back into what is now downtown known as [Pauses, can’t think 481 
of name.]  Well, see now, that’s awful.  It once again became everybody.  And then they had the 482 
same kind of problems again.  So about three or four years ago, maybe longer than that now, five or 483 
six, they pulled out and created Refugee Council USA, and that’s what they are now.  But anyway, 484 
that organization, at the time I’m speaking of now, was in New York and we built them a very first-485 
class commo operation, so all of this stuff would flow into there, they'd have a meeting and auction 486 
off [Chuckles]—you know, they'd take it case-by-case.  It was really funny.  They moved so quickly 487 
it really was like an auction in a way, ‘cause everybody was so quick and fast and different and, ‘Well 488 
here’s a family of six, they’re this and that, and one person has an illness’ and whatever.  And then, ‘I 489 
think we—maybe we can fit over there’ and they'd divide up the cases.  Then once—then they 490 
would have to go down to their networks and say, ‘OK, we have to resettle 3,000 people for this 491 
region working for one of those agencies.’  And once you had the name and address, then this 492 
organization we’re talking about would say, ‘OK, this person’s approved by INS.  Here’s the family, 493 
ICEM, you take them.’  And they would take them to see if they were medically OK to go, and 494 
make arrangements, travel arrangements, so on and so on, and take them off, get them to their new 495 
family or their new whatever—family, or if it wasn’t—in some cases it wasn’t a family; in many 496 
cases, actually, it would be just the local agency, the local office says, ‘OK, we can take two, three 497 
more cases.’  So we sent them to the local office.  The local office would either pump them right 498 
into a family they had waiting, or maybe had to put them in temporary housing for a little while.  But 499 
they would do that.  And that was—without that we never could have done 14,000 in a month from 500 
10 or 12 camps all scattered around Southeast Asia. 501 
 502 
(1:15:53)  Again, just my ignorance showing, but say, in the case of Thailand, where IRC is 503 
in charge—are they working with the other organizations in Thailand to help divvy up those 504 
responsibilities? Are they the ones that make those decisions, in consultation with the other 505 
organizations? 506 
Which decisions? 507 
About who gets what caseloads. 508 
No, no, that was made in New York.   509 
OK. 510 
That was made in New York. 511 
So what would the relation— 512 
We gave the authority to the NGOs once we had an INS-approved case.  They’d tell us where they 513 
wanted them sent.  We didn’t have to get into it.  We monitored what they were doing. 514 
But you got to bypass a lot of the mess that you didn’t really need to concern yourselves 515 
with on a weekly basis. 516 
That’s right.  Yeah.  So, to go back for a minute, Leo Cherne took his troops out there and they had 517 
this long—they were gone for a couple of weeks, I think, ten days to two weeks.  And these were all 518 
very senior people that were doing this.  They got back, and they went and they testified before the 519 
House Sub-committee, and just pow—just very, very strong testimony by very senior people, and it 520 
was just a big change. 521 
That was the help outside the building you were looking for. 522 
That was the help outside the building—and it stayed; it stayed for years.  Because yeah, OK, ‘Mr. 523 
Cherne, you’re right.  We’ll increase it a little bit.’  But every time that we were—every time we’d 524 
move a little bit, then we’d have a bigger problem.  So I had to—I was probably on the phone with 525 
Leo, I’d say at least two or three times a month, for years, because he could be—he was a great 526 
lobbyist, but he had to know where the action was.  ‘What is your problem?’  So I told him what our 527 
problem was.  Many of the other agencies also began to be very active and down here, going 528 
through the halls of Congress, lobbying for their own people, and so on.  But Leo started it.  And 529 
that’s—by the time we got into late ’78 and early ’79, the numbers were beginning to get really scary.  530 
And we knew a lot of people were drowning, the boats were being pushed back off, first by the 531 
Thai, and then we managed to get them slowed down at least, and then the Malaysians started doing 532 
it.  I was in Indonesia, in fairly early ’79, and all of a  sudden I'm getting reports—the embassy didn’t 533 
really have a clue—but from others about the numbers of people that were coming in to Indonesia, 534 
and—I can’t remember the name of the island.  They were coming—there’s a group of islands about 535 
300 miles east of Singapore. But they were coming in—and floods of them coming in, because both 536 
Thailand and Malaysia were shut down.  And there was something like—well, I can’t remember 537 
now, but big numbers, 30-, 40,000 people showing up in just a very short period of time, and 538 
obviously, what was happening was that the whole flow was continuing and now it was shifting to 539 
Indonesia.  And if the Indonesians started pushing them off, that would really be tough, because 540 
then the Philippines and Australia would be the next ones, and that's so far that we’d lose a lot of 541 
people, and the boats were all worn out by the time you got to Indonesia, anyway.  So as soon as we 542 
heard that, we shifted the real focus of our activities to Indonesia.  And you can talk to a guy 543 
named—where is your—oh, you’re in Minnesota.  You don’t get out to California all that much.  544 
Jim Schill was an officer working in Bangkok.  Lionel and one of his senior guys, and I took him and 545 
sent him down to Singapore, down to deal with the Indonesian problem, and he concluded, I think 546 
rightly, that we should be based in Singapore.  But with elements of our (***) out on these islands, it 547 
ended up he got one of these big oil rig platforms, not drilling platforms, but a residential platform 548 
of an oil company, and we rented it from them and ran his operation off of them over the Anambas 549 
islands.  And then it doesn’t sound like much, in some respects but you have to be a bureaucrat to 550 
understand what a remarkable job it was.  But he was able to find office space, recruit office people, 551 
recruit a large crew,  set up procedures, start this paperwork flowing—it took some time for it to 552 
flow there and back and forth again—and got some INS people out there, one thing or another.  He 553 
was moving 3,000 people a month within about four or five months after he got down there, which 554 
is amazing, just ‘cause each one of these is so hard to move.  But this—and then finally we got 555 
enough money, we got Jimmy Carter riled up enough about the whole situation, we had an 556 
international conference about this in July of ’79.  And our authorization up to that point had been 557 
7,000, and they had been bumping up all that they would allow, but at that point it was still 7,000 a 558 
month.  And at this conference we committed to moving 14,000 a month, and we did that for about 559 
the next two years, year and a half—closer to two years.  So that’s sort of a rough history of how the 560 
thing—and then after that we had lots of other things we did.  We set up training—largest ESL and 561 
cultural briefing programs ever in the—gave these people about four or five months to learn 562 
something about the US, a little rudimentary English, and then so on.  We had one of them in 563 
Bangkok, one of them down in Indonesia, and just south of Subic Bay. 564 
 565 
(1:27:04)  So these would have been sort of processing centers? 566 
They were processing centers, but they… 567 
But they included orientations and— 568 
They were not processing in the sense that we talked about before, because they'd already been 569 
processed and approved, approved for resettlement in the United States.  I think probably even—I 570 
can’t swear about this part, but I think probably it even had their family spotted.  Maybe not, 571 
because it could be a four or five month [orientation].  Maybe that was done later.  But all of the 572 
processing up to that—and this was specifically for training—we set it up in 1980, there was 573 
beginning to be a sense that we were dumping people in so fast that some of the social welfare 574 
agencies and others were beginning to complain a little bit that nobody speaks any English and so 575 
on—one thing or another.  And so we thought, ‘OK, we’d better do something about that,’ so this 576 
was our answer, and it worked fairly well. 577 
 578 
(1:28:34)  Is this something that ICEM would have administered for you? 579 
No.  I think that was just done by contract with one of the various agencies that specialized in that 580 
sort of thing.  And under the overall aegis of the local embassy and the refugee coordinator.  But I 581 
don’t think ICEM—ICEM would have picked people up from there and sent them—and maybe 582 
involved in—I’m not sure how the sponsorship was handled for them.  I want to say it was done 583 
before they left.  And it was easy in Bangkok, because the Center was about a two-hour drive from 584 
Bangkok.  But more of a problem there.  They probably—I’m just guessing now, I can’t remember 585 
exactly, but it was—I would guess that we must have done it through the Joint Volag program, 586 
where there were elements like that in all of the places where they had the training centers.  Yeah, 587 
that must be it.  So when they began to get near the end of their course, then they began to think 588 
about the other end.  Now how did all of this tie in with the Hmong?  One of the things that we 589 
tried to do with most of our programs was to try to resettle people as widely as possible, and not 590 
have them concentrate in one area, which if you took that kind of a flow and concentrated it all in 591 
one area, it would create problems, as it is in Minnesota now.  And we knew there would be 592 
secondary migration, but at least we wanted them to start out with them being not scattered so 593 
that—you know, three in this village and—but so with some reasonable amount of them.  And to 594 
do that, there had to be enough people there to form a kind of a magnet, so that you had to—which 595 
would happen anyway, if you said, ‘Don’t deliberately put them together.’  So that this area has 596 
pulled in—I don’t know how many they’ve pulled in now, but probably 50-, 60,000 at one point, 597 
and a lot more now.  Oklahoma City has a pretty good chunk.  New York has got a pretty good 598 
chunk, but not big compared with a lot of other groups in New York.  Houston got a pretty good-599 
sized chunk, and then California’s got the lion’s share.  The Hmong were kind of special in my eyes, 600 
at least.  I’m trying to think if we really had—I guess… [Pauses]  You know, Paul I’m not sure how 601 
deliberate it was, but I know that the Hmong themselves—I guess we still tried to resettle them 602 
without too much concentration, but at least in my mind, it wasn't as important, partly because it 603 
was a somewhat smaller number, partly because you could guess that at least some of the Hmong 604 
might need community more than—they all of them needed it to some degree, but it might be more 605 
important to the resettlement adjustment of the Hmong.  So I think we were less kind of aggressive 606 
about that. And then add to that the Hmong themselves, who are very active in communicating to 607 
their fellow Hmong where they were and the social security benefits are pretty good here, and 608 
training is available here, and maybe not there, which caused a little more—caused quite a lot of 609 
secondary migration.  I know that Mr. [David] Obey was a great supporter of the program for a long 610 
time, but I’m not so sure he is anymore. 611 
 612 
[Interviewer takes a moment or two to remember who David Obey, Congressman from Wisconsin 613 
is] 614 
 615 
(1:35:52)  He’s a little more—I think he’s probably getting a certain amount of static from some of 616 
his constituents.   617 
 618 
(1:36:03)  Well, I know there’s a big—this isn’t so much dealing with resettlement, but of 619 
course some of the Hmong who are still in Thailand in places like Huai Nam Khao, it was 620 
just announced in the Bangkok Post, I think two days ago, that Thailand and Laos have 621 
agreed that their Ministries of  Defense will take over this refugee resettlement issue. 622 
Yeah, yeah, yeah.  I saw that.  623 
So that’s burning up the phone lines to our elected officials in Washington these days, I 624 
think. 625 
Well, the Thai have, when you consider how many refugees have gone through there, I know that 626 
right after I retired from State and at the end of ’87, the very end, the first of ’88, that we began to 627 
get stories that the Thai were pushing boats off, and this thing went on and on and on until finally it 628 
was over.  But it never—it was not a program that died willingly, [Chuckles] so you had people 629 
pushing out—but anyway, the Thai were pushing boats off, and the reason was that the flow had 630 
increased, because people were being paid off in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand—very 631 
organized.  So the flow had increased, and the US, among others was not being very good about 632 
picking up the additional amounts, and the populations in the camps were growing.  All of a sudden 633 
they started ramming boats.  And so we went, three of us—let’s see, Al Santoli, who’s a writer, and 634 
one other fellow that I can’t recall his name.  We went out there to see what was going on, and 635 
people were saying, ‘Don’t worry about it, don’t worry about it.’  And the Thai, of course, were 636 
saying, ‘We’re not doing anything.’  And we got a—went down the track, then, in the gulf there, and 637 
got a little boat and went out, and began to find people whose boats had been rammed, and they 638 
were stranded on these little islands with no water and no food.  And we went back to Bangkok and 639 
went into the see the Foreign Ministry, the guy in charge of that, and he said, ‘Well, Mr. Lowman, 640 
you’ve been misinformed.’  And I said, ‘I'm really sorry, Mr. Minister, but you’ve been misinformed, 641 
because here are the pictures we took up in where we were at there.’  Well, of course he was 642 
embarrassed and said, ‘Well, we’ll have to look into this,’ and they did.  But it was that kind of thing 643 
that—you know, until they all went home, there were those that wanted them to go sooner and 644 
others who said, ‘No, it’s not time yet.’  And the Hmong always had that going on.  The Thai were 645 
much more receptive to the Hmong than they were any other of the refugees there.  I mean, after 646 
all, they were kind of cousins to their folks up there in the mountains, anyway, but at the same time, 647 
they felt very strongly that they weren’t going to just let their doors and let anybody in in Laos that 648 
wants to come over come over.  So they would do those things every once in a while. 649 
 650 
(1:40:50) I think, too, it got complicated as a significant portion of the Hmong community 651 
decided they wanted to stay in case they had a chance to go back. 652 
Well, that’s right. . .  [B]ut those were not major problems during the period that I was involved, ’81.  653 
And after I retired I went to work for refugee agencies, the NGOs, as an advocacy person.  I spent 654 
time with Refugees International and in fact, I was their second president, and then [my wife] 655 
opened up a restaurant [Both laugh] and I got out of the business for a while, and then Lionel came 656 
in as president.  But then I worked for the Catholics and so on, until 2003 I remained active in this 657 
area, and Lionel and I worked very closely together in many ways—very, very closely on a whole 658 
host of things, not just Southeast Asia, but especially Southeast Asia.  And that’s when we were 659 
saying it’s not right to give them only a choice of going to the United States or being forced to go 660 
home.  And for a long time, that was acceptable, but increasingly the Thai keep pushing to—say, ‘If 661 
they want to resettle in the United States that’s fine, but otherwise we want to send them home.  662 
They’re not refugees, anyway.  They don’t qualify.’  Well, you can have that argument, but… 663 
 664 
(1:43:21)  Yeah, I was actually in Huai Nam Khao last November and talked with the colonel 665 
who runs the place.  And you get the impression when you’re just talking to him that he’s a 666 
reasonably decent guy doing a very difficult job, and just trying to do the best he can to treat 667 
these people humanely.  But then you see how he treats the people in the camp, and you 668 
realize that he really just wants them to go away.  And even the rules posted at the camp all 669 
make it very clear that basically, ‘We are the law, we will tell you what to do, and your 670 
options are basically to go home.  That’s it.  We don’t want you here, we don’t want you 671 
going on to a third country.  You’re all supposed to go home.’  So it’s a very dicey situation 672 
there, I think. 673 
Yeah, that’s strong, yeah.  So they don’t even want third country resettlement.   674 
No, it says right on the sign, ‘No’—I think what they’re probably trying to do is to 675 
discourage further sneaking into the camp. 676 
Mm-hmm. 677 
And I’m sure they—I’m sure it’s true, at least to some degree, that there are human 678 
traffickers who are encouraging people to come to Thailand because they believe that they 679 
can then get them on to the United States or— 680 
Yeah. 681 
Australia or somewhere. 682 
[Mr. Lowman  excuses himself for a moment.  Recorder is paused.] 683 
 684 
(1:44:56)  But I know I haven’t given you very much Hmong-specific stuff— 685 
Oh no, that’s quite all right.   686 
But I just—it wasn’t really a—once you got past the first little bit—in the beginning the Thai were 687 
very rough on some of the Hmong and ran ‘em back across the border there.  And there was always 688 
the threat of that, I guess, and there were some—it sort of would depend who was in charge of the 689 
border at the time, that kind of thing.  But in those days, if they’d been prepared to go to the US, we 690 
were probably prepared to take ‘em—most of ‘em. And the Thai would have permitted it.  But what 691 
really was the problem that came was that so many of them really didn’t want to leave.  And that—692 
from our perspective, that would be bad for them, to force them to leave, come to the United States, 693 
and bad for us.  We really don’t want people that you have to handcuff!  So we always had to try to 694 
do something about that, and one of the things we tried to do was to make sure that—we wanted to 695 
do as much as we could to help the people in the camps, but we also wanted to make sure that they 696 
didn’t get so much help that they were better off than the local Thai.  So we had programs to assist 697 
the villages—the Thai villages nearby, that kind of thing. 698 
 699 
(1:47:12)  I’ve heard his name, and of course we mentioned him briefly as well, but I don’t 700 
know—you said Albert Corcos was a seasoned veteran.  What had he been doing up to the 701 
time that you recruited him to be part of this effort. 702 
Well, he was a long-time employee, senior employee of ICEM in other situations, but he was new to 703 
this problem. 704 
So this was a long-term interest of his, and he certainly had the expertise that you needed 705 
to— 706 
I pulled him out of retirement the last time when I was—that was ’82 to ’86.  I was down in 707 
Honduras, and we had lots of camps., Salvadoran camps on the border, and they were a mess.  I had 708 
to get Albert in to help me out with that.   709 
So he would have been in his 70s then, I suppose.   710 
Yeah.  Yeah. 711 
 712 
(1:48:18)  If I wanted to contact somebody to find out where the State Department records 713 
are involving resettlement of people from Thai refugee camps, where would I go? 714 
I’d go to the refugee bureau. 715 
The State Department Refugee Bureau. 716 
Uh-huh.  What do they call it now?  They call it [Pauses]  I can’t recall what they call it now.  They 717 
changed its name.  They changed its name for cosmetic purposes.  Something like Migration and 718 
Refugees. 719 
Well, I’ll see if I can find it. 720 
Population, maybe. 721 
OK.  I’ll see what I can find out.  Well, I know I’ve taken a lot of your time already, and I 722 
sure do appreciate you taking time out for me.  This has been very helpful. 723 
 724 
[The two exchange a few words of thanks, encouragement, and farewell, recorder is turned off, 725 
interview is over.] 726 
